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                                                 I.  Introduction 
Although corporations and special interest groups spend billions of dollars annually to lobby 
Congress and federal agencies (Center for Responsive Politics, 2012), there is an absence of robust 
evidence on corporate returns to lobbying. The main empirical challenge in examining this issue is that 
the decision to lobby is likely to be endogenous to observable and unobservable firm characteristics. We 
examine whether the stock market considers lobbying expenditures to be value-enhancing using several 
events that may affect the ability of firms to lobby, but are exogenous to their characteristics and prior 
lobbying decisions. We also examine the channels through which lobbying may create value for firms. 
The main event we focus on occurred on January 3, 2006, when the prominent Washington D.C. 
lobbyist Jack Abramoff  pleaded guilty to  bribing  government  officials  in exchange for  favorable 
decisions made on issues related to his clients’ interests. Described as the “biggest public corruption 
scandal in a generation,” (“Case bringing new scrutiny to a system and a profession,” The Washington 
Post, January 4, 2006), the guilty plea generated intense public and media scrutiny of the lobbying 
process, making it damaging for politicians to be associated with lobbyists, thereby limiting the latter 
group’s political access and influence.
1 Using Mr. Abramoff’s guilty plea as an exogenous negative 
shock to the ability of firms to lobby, we examine the market reaction to this event to investigate 
whether lobbying creates value for the shareholders of firms that lobby. 
The theoretical literature has shown that one of the main channels through which lobbying may 
add value is by allowing  firms and interest groups to communicate their specialized knowledge of 
particular issues to uninformed or overburdened policy makers; see Grossman and Helpman (2001) and 
1 Describing the response to the Abramoff guilty plea one lobbyist noted: “In the short run, members of Congress will get 
allergic to lobbyists…They’ll be nervous about taking calls and holding meetings, to say nothing of lavish trips to Scotland. 
Those will be out.” (“Case Bringing New Scrutiny to a System and a Profession,” The Washington Post, January 4, 2006). 
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                                                 Gregor (2011) for surveys.
2 However, the lobbying process is viewed less benignly in the public sphere, 
where it is commonly assumed that lobbyists use unethical means to influence politicians.
3 In this paper, 
we examine whether lobbying mainly adds value by allowing communication with lawmakers, or if it 
also adds value by influencing policy makers through potentially unethical means.
4 
To investigate whether lobbying adds value, we start by examining the market response to Jack 
Abramoff’s guilty plea to bribery and corruption, on January 3, 2006. This event is exogenous to firms’ 
characteristics and prior lobbying decisions, and heightened expectations of a decrease in the influence 
of lobbyists.
5 The rationale behind our empirical strategy is as follows: If lobbying adds value, firms that 
spend more on lobbying should experience a greater decrease in value in response to a potential decrease 
in the influence of lobbyists. To implement the test, we use data on all firms included in the S&P 500 
index between 2000 and 2008, and examine their market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns in a 3-
day window around the date of Mr. Abramoff’s guilty plea. 
The results show  that  firms  that spend more on lobbying experience a significantly greater 
decrease in value in response to the guilty plea. To illustrate, for the sample of firms with positive 
lobbying activity, we find that a standard deviation increase in average lobbying expenditures (about 
$6.8 million) prior to the event year, is associated with an average decrease in abnormal returns of 
0.20%, or about $49.8 million, in the 3-day window around the event. Since the guilty plea potentially 
2 Policy makers may discount the information of interest groups if the groups have a reason to be biased and the information 
is unverifiable. However, by sending a signal through lobbying, even biased experts may credibly communicate with policy 
makers (Crawford and Sobel (1982), Austen-Smith (1993, 1994), and Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010)). 
3 A Gallup Poll survey of public perceptions regarding the honesty and ethical standards of different professions places 
lobbyists at the bottom of the ranking, considerably below car salesmen (“Lobbyists Debut at Bottom of Honesty and Ethics 
List,” Gallup, December 10, 2007). 
4 The theoretical underpinning of this type of rent seeking activity is analyzed in Krueger (1974). This paper considers the 
welfare implications of having economic rents due to trade restrictions and the competition between firms over these rents. 
The paper discusses the case in which competition results in the division of rents between government officials and firms. 
Part of our goal is to come up with a lower bound estimate of the rents obtained by the firm.  
5 Although the practices of Jack Abramoff’s lobbying firm came under scrutiny in 2004, the 2006 guilty plea was a major 
event because Mr. Abramoff provided evidence against several government officials as a condition of this plea. This event 
triggered special investigations, led to legislation passed by the U.S. Congress targeting corruption in lobbying, and focused 
public attention on the influence of lobbyists. We describe the extent of media coverage in Section II and show that the 
coverage peaked in the immediate aftermath of the guilty plea. 
3 
 
                                                 limited  lobbyists’ political access, the  observed  decrease in firm value  associated with lobbying 
expenditures in response to the plea is  consistent with the view that  lobbying  creates  value  for 
shareholders. It is important to note that since the Abramoff event potentially restricts firms’ ability to 
lobby but does not eliminate lobbying activity, these results capture a lower bound estimate of the 
corporate value of lobbying. 
We also investigate the channels by which lobbying may add value, namely, whether the value 
comes mainly from allowing firms to communicate with policy makers about specialized issues, or 
whether  it partly  arises  from  potentially  unethical arrangements between firms and politicians.  To 
investigate the latter mechanism we undertake two tests. First, since data on unethical lobbying activities 
are not directly observable, we hypothesize that firms that are more likely to be involved in unethical 
business practices may also be more likely to engage in unethical lobbying, and investigate whether 
these firms are differently affected by the guilty plea. Second, we examine investors’ response to a bill 
aimed at restricting corrupt lobbying practices. 
We use several variables to identify a firm’s propensity to engage in unethical behavior. First, we 
examine whether firms that have an enforcement action brought against them by the Securities and 
Exchanges Commission (SEC) for violating SEC rules against bribery, insider trading, and accounting 
fraud among other things, are more affected by the plea. The results suggest that in response to Mr. 
Abramoff’s guilty plea, a firm that spends more on lobbying experiences a greater loss in value if it has 
been charged with a SEC violation in the five years prior to this event. For example, firms with a SEC 
action experience a 0.34% greater decrease in value around the guilty plea in response to an increase in 
lobbying expenditures, compared to firms without any charges. 
As an alternative measure of the likelihood that firms may engage in unethical behavior, we 
investigate whether firms that have a strong policy against bribery and corruption, i.e. code of ethics, 
4 
 respond differently to the guilty plea.
6 The results show that in the 3-day event window around the 
guilty plea, the decrease in value associated with lobbying is significantly greater for firms without a 
strong code of ethics.  
Using the corporate social responsibility (CSR) rankings produced by Kinder, Lydenberg and 
Domini (KLD), which ranks firms along a number of dimensions, we find that in response to the guilty 
plea, the decrease in value associated with lobbying is significantly more pronounced for companies 
with a worse CSR reputation.
7 These results suggest that firms that are more likely to be involved in 
unethical business practices experience a greater decrease in value in response to possible restrictions on 
the influence of lobbyists.  
The guilty plea by Jack Abramoff focused attention on corrupt policy makers, and the ensuing 
public pressure spurred legislative efforts to address corruption in the lobbying process. To test the value 
from potentially unethical lobbying practices we consider the market response to the first lobbying-
related bill voted on by the U.S. Congress following the guilty plea, the “Lobbying Transparency and 
Accountability Act of 2006”. This bill targeted corruption in lobbying by increasing disclosure and 
penalties for lobbyists who violate lobbying rules, and curbing quid pro quo arrangements between 
lobbyists and government officials, such as revolving door practices. 
The results indicate that firms that spend more on lobbying experience a greater decrease in 
market value in response to the introduction of this bill in the U.S. Senate. For example, a standard 
deviation increase in lobbying expenses is associated with an average decrease in market value of $37.5 
million  in the 3-day window around the introduction of the bill. Since  firms  that  only  engage in 
legitimate lobbying are less likely to be affected by restrictions on corrupt lobbying practices, this result 
6 Our measure for firms’ code of ethics is based on proprietary data collected by EIRIS, a non-profit organization, which 
conducts research on the ethical codes of publicly traded firms around the world. 
7 Hong, Kubik, and Scheinkman (2012) use KLD scores as an empirical measure of “corporate goodness”. We note that CSR 
rankings  may be closely related to industry characteristics, and include Fama-French  49 industry dummies in all 
specifications. 
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                                                 further supports the view that part of the value from lobbying may arise from potentially unethical 
arrangements with policy makers. We note that the stock price reaction may partly reflect the increased 
cost of complying with stricter lobbying regulation. 
To  further  establish  whether  lobbying adds value, we consider a third lobbying-related 
exogenous event, another corruption scandal, which occurred two years after Jack Abramoff’s guilty 
plea.  On November 25, 2008, the FBI raided the offices of one of the largest lobbying firms in 
Washington D.C., the PMA Group, founded by top lobbyist, Paul Magliocchetti. The ensuing 
investigation led to the eventual closure of Mr. Magliocchetti’s firm, and his imprisonment. Examining 
the market response to the raid, the results indicate a significant decrease in the market value of firms 
based on their lobbying activity in the 3-day event window surrounding the FBI raid.
8 
Theory suggests that lobbying  may  facilitate  the  communication of expert  information to 
uninformed and/or overburdened policy makers. To explore the informational value of lobbying, we 
consider whether firms characterized by a greater degree of information asymmetry derive more value 
from  lobbying.  Using  firm-specific  measures of opaqueness,  including  asset  intangibility, R&D 
expenditures, and accounting transparency, we  do not find robust evidence that more opaque  firms 
benefit more from lobbying. However, since our empirical framework examines the market reaction to 
events that potentially limited corrupt lobbying practices,  and not legitimate communications with 
policy makers, this result does not imply that lobbying has no informational value. 
We conduct several robustness checks. First, we show that firms that employed members of Jack 
Abramoff’s team as lobbyists experience a greater decrease in value in response to the guilty plea, 
corroborating that we are capturing the effects of the guilty plea, and not concurrent events. Second, to 
further address the endogeneity of lobbying expenditures, we perform a matched sample analysis by 
8 For these additional events we also find that the negative stock price response is stronger for firms with a greater propensity 
to engage in unethical behavior, although this effect is not statistically significant.  
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                                                 matching non-lobbying  firms  to firms that  lobby, and  also  use  a generalized propensity score 
methodology (to account for the continuous nature of lobbying expenditures), to match similar firms 
with different levels of lobbying activity. The results are robust to using both of these approaches. We 
also show that  our results  are not  driven by confounding factors  such as calendar time  effects. 
Examining the market reaction on the same date as the guilty plea, but in the years prior to and after 
2006 (the year of the plea), we do not find a significant association between lobbying expenditures and 
market returns. 
Firms that seek to influence politicians may also do so by contributing to electoral campaigns, or 
through political connections. For example, the lobbying firms in our sample contributed about $0.5 
million to electoral campaigns on average, compared to $3.9 million spent  on lobbying during the 
sample period. We show that the lobbying results retain their sign and statistical significance after 
controlling for campaign contributions, suggesting that lobbying is not a proxy for contributions. We 
also find that the impact of lobbying on firm value remains statistically significant after controlling for 
the political connections of corporate board members, indicating that lobbying is not a proxy for partisan 
preferences. Lastly, we show that our results are robust to controlling for standard measures of industry 
competition and regulation. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to use an exogenous shock to identify the 
shareholder value of corporate lobbying, and to provide evidence suggesting that part of this value may 
be attributed to unethical practices that are likely to bias politicians rather than simply inform them. In 
two related studies, Chen, Parsley, and Yang (2010) find that firms that lobby have better financial and 
accounting performance relative to non-lobbying firms; and, Hill, Kelly, and Van Ness (2011) find that 
the annual excess returns of lobbying firms are higher than those of non-lobbying firms. Our paper 
differs from these studies in the following ways: First, our event study approach mitigates some of the 
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 identification issues that arise regarding endogeneity of the lobbying decision. Second, we investigate 
channels through which lobbying may add value. 
Another  related  strand of literature  examines  the impact of campaign contributions on firm 
value.
9 Jayachandran (2006) uses Senator Jim Jeffords’ switch in party affiliation, which shifted control 
of the Senate to the Democratic party, to show that contributions create value; Claessens, Feijen, and 
Laeven (2008) find that Brazilian firms that contribute to election campaigns experience higher stock 
returns; and, Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) show that campaign contributions by U.S. firms 
are positively related to future returns. We find that lobbying expenditures are not a proxy for campaign 
contributions. Since the majority of campaign contributions often come from individuals, the extant 
literature has argued that they are a means for political participation, rather than a primary channel for 
influencing policy  (Chappell  (1982),  and  Ansolabehere,  de  Figueiredo, and Snyder  (2003)).
10  In 
contrast, lobbying expenditures are undertaken by firms, industry, and interest groups, are often targeted 
to specific policies, and involve larger amounts. For instance, lobbying expenditures in 2006 were over 
$2.59 billion, compared to $345 million in campaign contributions (Bombardini and Trebbi, (2009)). 
Examining  policy  outcomes  of lobbying,  De  Figueiredo and Silverman (2006)  find  that the 
returns to lobbying by universities for educational earmarks are larger when the university is located in 
the state (district) of a Senate (House) Appropriations Committee member; Kang (2012) shows that 
lobbying expenditures by the energy sector yield average returns of 102%  to  113%;  Richter, 
Samphantharak, and Timmons (2009) find that U.S. firms that spend more on lobbying have lower 
effective tax rates; and, Yu and Yu (2011) show that lobbying firms are less likely to be detected 
committing fraud. 
9 See Stratmann (2005) for a recent survey. 
10 For instance, Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) document that after controlling for constituent and legislator 
effects, there is little relationship between contributions and legislator votes. 
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                                                 Our paper also contributes to the growing literature on political connections (Roberts (1990), 
Fisman (2001), Khwaja and Mian (2005), Faccio (2006), Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006), and 
Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009, 2013)). These studies consider the role of political connections, while 
we focus on the value of lobbying. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the events, Section III 
describes our data, Section IV presents the main results, Section V describes the robustness tests, and 
Section VI concludes. 
II.  Events 
Our analysis of the value-relevance of corporate lobbying utilizes three exogenous events that 
affect firms’ ability to lobby, but are uncorrelated with their characteristics. We first focus on our main 
event: the guilty plea by top lobbyist Jack Abramoff on January 3, 2006 to criminal felony counts related 
to the corruption of public officials and defrauding of American Indian tribes. As a condition of the plea, 
Mr. Abramoff provided evidence that led to the conviction of more than twenty elected representatives, 
Congressional staff, and executive branch officials. 
While the investigation of Jack Abramoff began in 2004, his guilty plea generated widespread 
media coverage of what had been, until then, mainly a Washington D.C. scandal. In Figure I we describe 
the number of news articles published daily between January 2004 and December 2006 that mention 
“Abramoff”, “lobbying”, and “regulation”. The graph shows a sharp increase in news coverage in the 
immediate aftermath of the guilty plea. Given the heightened public scrutiny of politicians’ relationships 
with lobbyists, it appears that the plea increased expectations that (unethical) lobbying practices would 
face restrictions in the future. For instance, there were about twenty bills related to lobbying introduced 
in the 109
th Congress, all but one after the guilty plea in January 2006. 
9 
 To check if there were other concurrent national news events that may affect market returns on 
January 3, 2006, we examined the front page headlines for the New York Times, Washington Post, and 
Wall Street Journal, on the following day, January 4, 2006. All three reported the Jack Abramoff guilty 
plea  on their front page. The  only  other  major  news  item  reported  by  two of these three  national 
newspapers on that day was the mining disaster in West Virginia.
11  
In the aftermath of the plea, the U.S. Congress debated a number of bills intended to regulate 
corruption in lobbying. We consider the first lobbying-related bill introduced following the Abramoff 
plea, the “Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006 – 527 Reform Act of 2006” (Bill 
S.2349) sponsored by Senator Trent Lott (R-MS).  It was the first bill on lobbying to come out of 
committee after the Abramoff plea, and also the first to be voted on in both the U.S. House and Senate. 
There were no other lobbying-related bills passed by both chambers of the 109
th Congress.
12 Bill S.2349 
was introduced in the U.S. Senate on March 1, 2006, passed by the Senate on March 29, 2006, and 
passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on May 23, 2006. The dates of the events are summarized 
in Appendix I. 
Bill S.2349 focused on curbing corruption in the lobbying process. As described in Appendix II, 
the main provisions  of the bill  increased  disclosure,  imposed  penalties for violating  rules,  limited 
revolving door arrangements, where former policy makers and officials obtain employment in lobbying 
firms, and suspended privately funded travel and gifts from lobbyists, among other restrictions. We also 
note that while the U.S. Senate passed S.2349 with a 90-8 vote, the legislative outcome might not have 
11 The New York Times in its “On this day” series, which describes important events in history for a particular day, lists the 
Abramoff guilty plea as the most notable event of January 3, 2006. 
12 The only other bill to come out of committee, H.R. 4975, was passed by the U.S. House, but not by the U.S. Senate, while 
S.2349 was voted on and passed by both chambers, although it is yet to become law.  
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                                                 been fully anticipated since the vote was not preceded by a lengthy discussion period, thus limiting 
information dissemination.
13 
The third event we consider is a corruption scandal involving another prominent lobbyist, Paul 
Magliocchetti, who headed the lobbying firm, the PMA Group. While the scandal was primarily related 
to campaign contributions, it involved a prominent lobbyist. Mr. Magliochetti, a former staffer on the 
House Defense Appropriations subcommittee with close ties to the late Representative Jack Murtha (D-
PA), helped his lobbying firm’s clients secure more than $100 million in military contracts. He pleaded 
guilty to giving more than $380,000 in illegal contributions to policy makers in charge of the Pentagon’s 
budget (“Ex-Lobbyist Pleads Guilty to Illegal Campaign Donations,” The New York Times, September 
24, 2010). Unlike the Jack Abramoff case, this scandal did not receive as much media coverage since no 
politicians were directly implicated. On November 25
th, 2008, the FBI raided the offices of the PMA 
Group, and this eventually led to its closure on March 31
st, 2009. We focus on these two events. 
III.  Data 
We start with all 753 companies that were included in the S&P 500 index between 2000 and 
2008. For these firms we collect data on lobbying expenditures for the years 2003 to 2005, the three year 
period prior to Jack  Abramoff’s  guilty plea in  2006. The data are available from the Center for 
Responsive Politics (CRP), which collects all lobbying disclosure reports filed with the Secretary of the 
Senate’s Office of Public Records by any entity engaged in lobbying activities with costs exceeding 
$10,000 in any 6-month period. The data include spending by companies and their subsidiaries through 
13 Investigating activity related to the bill, such as roll call votes, we found that there are two relevant votes prior to the 
passage: a rejected amendment and a rejected cloture motion. Most of the political activity, which culminated with passage of 
the bill, took place between 28
th and 29
th March, 2006 (both dates are in the 3-day event window around the Senate vote). 
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                                                 “in-house” lobbyists and professional lobbying firms.
14 We do not observe lobbying expenditures by 
trade groups and industry associations on the behalf of firms.
15 
From this sample we drop 105 firms that stopped trading before the event date of January 3
rd, 
2006 (most were involved in a merger/acquisition), and 19 firms that started trading after that date. To 
mitigate the effect of potential outliers or possible firm-specific news (e.g. some firms were engaged in 
M&A talks around the event period), we exclude firms in the 1
st and 99
th percentiles of abnormal 
returns. This generates  a final sample of 617 firms, of which 421 firms report positive  lobbying 
expenditures between 2003 and 2005, and 196 firms comprise the non-lobbying group. Henceforth, we 
refer to firms that report $10,000 and more in lobbying expenditures as the lobbying sample, and the 
remaining as the non-lobbying sample. Table I describes the data for the full sample in Panel A, the 
lobbying sample in Panel B, and the non-lobbying sample in Panel C. All variables are described in 
Appendix III. 
Using stock market data from CRSP, we construct the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns for 
each firm around the event  dates. In Table I, CAR (-1,+1)  is computed as the market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal return in a 3-day window around January 3
rd, 2006, the date of Mr. Abramoff’s 
guilty plea.  Returns  are adjusted using  the CRSP value-weighted index. Throughout the paper we 
tabulate and report results for the 3-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. To verify the 
robustness  of our findings, we also use market-model adjusted returns and 7-day  window (-3,+3) 
returns. Since our main specifications are robust to the alternative event window and returns definition, 
we do not report these results to save space. 
14 A description of the data is available at http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/methodology.php 
15  A recent study notes that lobbying through trade groups and firm-level lobbying are complementary, where trade 
associations operate mostly in the realm of industry-level goods and regulatory politics, while companies focus on company-
level goods and distributive politics (Drutman, 2009). 
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                                                 In Figure II we plot the median cumulative abnormal returns for the lobbying and non-lobbying 
sample on each day of the 10-day window around January 3, 2006. Specifically, for each firm we sum 
up daily abnormal returns starting from day -5 until day +5. The figure suggests that the CARs of firms 
that lobby are more negative than the CARs of non-lobbying firms, starting from the event date. 
We construct two measures of lobbying activity. First, Lobbying Rank, groups firms into deciles 
based on their three-year lobbying expenditures prior to 2006. Companies with the highest lobbying 
expenses are assigned a rank of 10 (average lobbying expenditures of $20.6 million), and those with the 
lowest lobbying expenses are assigned a rank of 1 (average lobbying expenditures of $66.6 thousand). 
Appendix IV provides the cutoff points for each decile based on lobbying expenditures. Firms that do 
not lobby are assigned a rank of 0. From Table I we note that the average value of Lobbying Rank is 
about 3.7. 
The second measure we use is Lobbying Expenses, defined as the sum of lobbying expenditures, 
expressed in thousands,  for each firm in the three years preceding the Abramoff guilty plea, and 
constructed for the sample of 421 firms that lobby. In unreported results we verify that our findings are 
robust to using lobbying expenditures from 2005, immediately preceding the event year. From Table I 
Panel B we note that on average firms spent nearly $4 million between 2003 and 2005. The biggest 
spender during our sample period is General Electric Company with nearly $56 million in lobbying 
expenditures. Consistent with the minimum filing requirement, the smallest reported lobbying expense is 
$10,000. 
Figure III, Panel A, examines the difference in lobbying expenditures between 2005 and 2007 for 
two groups of firms: Firms that experienced a negative market reaction to Abramoff’s guilty plea on 
January 3, 2006, and those that experienced a positive reaction. Semi-annual lobbying expenses for each 
firm are scaled by the firm’s semi-annual lobbying expenses during the first half of 2005. The plotted 
13 
 lines, describing the difference in the mean and median values of the lobbying expenditures between the 
two groups,  suggest that firms in the former group, with  a  negative market reaction,  reduce  their 
lobbying expenditures more than firms in the latter group. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
Abramoff event increased restrictions on lobbying, since it appears that firms that experienced the 
greatest decrease in value in response to the guilty plea  subsequently  also  reduced their lobbying 
expenditures the most.  
Using the same measure of lobbying expenses, in Panel B, we graphically  compare the 
difference in lobbying expenditures between 2005 and 2007 for “Low Rep” and “High Rep” firms, 
where “Low Rep” refers to firms that have a poor reputation for corporate ethics, whereas “High Rep” 
refers to firms that do not. Specifically, “Low Rep” firms are those with: 1) an SEC Action, 2) without a 
Code of Ethics, and, 3) with a KLD Concerns measure that is above the 75th percentile for the sample, 
while “High Rep” firms are those: 1) without an SEC Action, 2) with a Code of Ethics, and 3) with a 
KLD Concerns measure that is below the 75
th percentile. The plotted lines, describing the difference in 
the mean and median values of the lobbying expenditures between firms with a low and high corporate 
reputation, suggest that firms with a poor reputation for corporate ethics reduce their lobbying 
expenditures more than firms with a strong ethical reputation. 
To establish firm-level connections to Jack Abramoff, we examine all lobbying reports filed 
between 2003 and 2005 to collect the names of individual lobbyists employed by all the firms in our 
sample. These data are used to identify whether any of these lobbyists are members of “Team 
Abramoff”, the team of lobbyists assembled by Jack Abramoff when he worked at the lobbying firm 
Greenberg Taurig, who were mainly former aides to prominent politicians.
16 To measure the relative 
importance of these lobbyists to the firm, we define the variable Team Abramoff as the ratio of a firm’s 
lobbyists who were also close associates of Mr. Abramoff, to the total number of lobbyists employed by 
16 The members of Team Abramoff are identified from news sources http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Team_Abramoff 
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                                                 the firm. From Panel B of Table I we note that this ratio is about 0.2% on average, with a maximum 
value of 22%. 
We use three different data sources to capture the likelihood that firms may engage in unethical 
behavior. First, we hand-collected data from the Enforcement and Litigation sections of the Securities 
and Exchanges Commission about all investigations, including civil lawsuits and financial reporting 
related enforcement actions to identify firms that were subject to regulatory actions and lawsuits brought 
by the SEC. We define SEC Action as a dummy variable equal to 1 if a sample firm is involved in any 
such SEC enforcement between 2001 and 2005, and 0 otherwise. On average, about 10% of our sample 
firms appear in such actions as shown in Panel A of Table I. The incidence of actions against firms that 
lobby is more than twice as high at 13% compared to 5% for the non-lobbying sample. 
Second, we examine the strength of a firm’s code of ethics as analyzed by EIRIS, a non-profit 
organization conducting research on the ethical codes of publicly traded firms.
17 The data are collected 
from annual reports, company websites, and survey responses, and examine whether a company has a 
code of ethics, the quality of the code, and its implementation. In particular, the data record whether the 
firm is committed to obeying the law, and, has a policy against paying bribes, among other ethics related 
policies. We evaluate firms based on the following questions: “Does the Company have a code of ethics 
and, if so, how comprehensive is it?” and “Does the Company have a system for implementing the code 
of ethics and, if so, how comprehensive is it?” Firms are considered as having a strong code of ethics if 
their performance along both of these questions is “Intermediate” or “Advanced”. We define the 
variable, Code of Ethics, as an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for firms with a strong code of ethics 
and 0 otherwise. From Table I we note that on average about 35% of lobbying firms have strong codes 
of ethics, compared to 20% of the non-lobbying firms. 
17 More about the description, history of the organization, and research methodology may be found at http://www.eiris.org/ 
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                                                 Lastly, we use the corporate social responsibility (CSR) rankings published by KLD Research & 
Analytics, which evaluates large U.S. firms along the following seven categories: Community Relations, 
Corporate Governance, Diversity, Human Rights, Employee Relations, Products, and Environment; and, 
assigns one point if the firm meets the criteria for a particular strength or concern. We define Concerns 
as the aggregate number of concerns across all categories, and Strengths as the aggregate number of 
strengths along the seven categories. To identify firms with relatively more concerns (strengths) we also 
construct indicator variables  for firms with concerns  (strengths)  above the 75
th  percentile, 
Concerns>P75 (Strengths>P75). From Table I we note that, on average, the lobbying sample has more 
concerns  and strengths than  the non-lobbying sample.  For example,  Exxon Mobil has the highest 
number of concerns and also ranks among the top spenders with a Lobbying Rank of 10. In contrast, 
J.M. Smucker and Symantec are among the companies with the best CSR reputation and a Lobbying 
Rank of 0 and 5, respectively. The correlation between Lobbying Rank and the concerns score is 0.48 for 
the lobbying sample. 
We also examine the effect of corruption in the state where the firm is headquartered using two 
measures of corruption. The first metric  is  the  BGA Index, which is constructed by  the  Better 
Government Association (BGA), and measures the relative strength of the states’ laws that promote 
integrity.  Specifically,  the  BGA examines states’  laws related to  the  Freedom of Information  Act, 
Whistleblower Protection Laws, Campaign Finance Laws, Conflict of Interest Laws, and Laws about 
Gifts, Trips, and Honoraria, and assigns a combined score to each state along these dimensions. Higher 
scores indicate stronger laws and better citizen protection. We use the index as of 2002, as it is the last 
release of these data prior to the Abramoff event. We also adopt a second measure based on Glaeser and 
Saks’s (2006) study, Corruption Rate, which is the number of corruption convictions of state level 
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 officials between 1976 and 2002, relative to the average population of the state. In contrast to the BGA 
Index, a higher value of Corruption Rate indicates a more corrupt state.  
To examine the information benefits  of corporate lobbying, we use three measures of 
information asymmetry at the firm level based on asset intangibility and accounting transparency. To 
capture asset intangibility we use the ratio of R&D expenditures to total expenses, and the ratio of 
intangible assets to total assets. For accounting transparency we use the earnings management measure 
from Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), which is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of a 
firm’s operating income to the standard deviation of the firm’s cash flow, where a higher score indicates 
less earnings management in terms of earnings smoothing, and less information asymmetry.
18 Based on 
the earnings management measure, we construct Low Transparency, as a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if a firm has a transparency metric below the 25
th percentile of the sample. 
To capture the partisan affiliations of firms, we use data on the connections of corporate boards 
from Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) to construct two political connection variables. Republican on 
Board is equal to 1 if the firm has a Republican Party connection (connected either to the Republican 
Party or to both the Republican and Democratic parties) through its executives and board members, and 
0 otherwise (connected only to the Democratic Party, or not connected to either party). The second 
variable, Democrat on Board, treats connections to the Democratic Party in the same way. 
Since lobbying may depend on the competitive structure of industries, we construct the industry 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures industry concentration based on the Fama and 
French 12 industry classifications. The average value of HHI is 2.31 for the sample of lobbying firms 
and 2.09 for the sample of non-lobbying firms (Table I). We also define Regulated Industry as a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm belongs to a regulated industry such as public utilities, railroad, 
18 Cash flow from operations is calculated as operating income minus accruals, where accruals are calculated as: (∆Total 
Current Assets – ∆Cash) – (∆Total Current Liabilities – ∆Short-term Debt – ∆Taxes Payable) – Depreciation Expense. 
Standard deviations are estimated over the 5-year period ending in 2005. 
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                                                 banking, finance, or insurance. Table I shows that on average 22% of lobbying firms are in a regulated 
industry, compared to 18% of non-lobbying firms. 
We collect data on campaign contributions made by individual employees and Political Action 
Committees (PACs) of firms during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles from OpenSecrets.org. From 
Panel B of Table I we note that our sample firms spent nearly $550,000 on average during the years 
2003 to 2005, substantially less than the average lobbying expenditures of about $3.9 million during the 
same period. We also create a Contributions Rank variable, similar to Lobbying Rank described above. 
From Table I we note that firms that lobby are larger, with an average book value of assets of 
$26.9 billion, compared to $12.2 billion for firms that do not lobby. We control for firm value and 
growth opportunities using MB Ratio, which is the ratio of a firm’s market value of equity to its book 
value, and firm size using total assets. We also winsorize these variables. Note from Table I that the 
lobbying sample is similar to the non-lobbying sample in terms of the market to book ratio.  
IV.  Results  
A.  Does lobbying add value? 
The guilty plea by Jack Abramoff on January 3
rd 2006 to charges of corruption and bribery 
affected the ability of firms to lobby while being exogenous to firm characteristics. Hence, the market’s 
response to this event may indicate whether investors view lobbying as a value-enhancing activity. We 
start with the following specification: 
,    (1) 
where CAR (-1,+1) is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (in percentages) for a 3-day 
window centered at January 3, 2006. Lobbying captures measures of the company’s lobbying activity, Xi 
includes firm size captured by Log(Assets), the market to book ratio of firms in the year preceding the 
( ) i i i i Effects Fixed Industry X Lobbying CAR ε β β α + + + + = + −     1 , 1 2 1
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 event, and industry fixed-effects based on the Fama-French 49 industry classification. Standard errors 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
Table II, columns (1) and (2) report the results for the full sample (All Firms), and columns (3) to 
(6) for the sample of firms that lobby (Lobbying Sample). The results in the first two columns suggest 
that in response to the guilty plea, firms that spend more on lobbying experience a significant decrease 
in abnormal returns compared to firms that spend less, and those that do not lobby. For example, from 
the estimated coefficient of Lobbying Rank in column (2) we note that a one standard deviation increase 
in Lobbying Rank is associated with a $38 million decrease in market value on average, around this 
event. 
Considering lobbying expenditures in columns (5) and (6) for the sample of lobbying firms, the 
results suggest that firms that spend more, experience a larger decrease in abnormal returns around 
Abramoff’s  plea.  To illustrate, from  the coefficient of Log(Lobbying  Expenses)  in  column (6) we 
estimate that a one standard deviation increase in lobbying expenditures is associated with a $50 million 
decrease in value on average, around the event. The negative market response to an event that reduces 
the influence of lobbyists is consistent with the view that the market views  lobbying as  a  value-
enhancing activity. 
B.  Do less ethical firms benefit more from lobbying? 
Does lobbying add value simply by allowing firms to communicate specialized information to 
overburdened policy makers, or does it also add value by facilitating potentially unethical arrangements 
between firms and politicians? To investigate the second question, we focus on the lobbying sample, and 
examine whether the value from lobbying varies based on the likelihood that firms that lobby may 
engage in unethical practices. We use three broad categories of measures to identify the likelihood of 
unethical behavior: violations of SEC regulations, rules and procedures put in place by the firm to 
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 address unethical practices, and metrics of corporate reputation based on social responsibility rankings. 
The results are reported in Table III, Panels A to C. 
We start by investigating whether the loss in value due to lobbying is greater for firms that have 
been charged with violating SEC rules against insider trading, accounting fraud, or bribery, among other 
things. Columns (1) and (3) of Table III, Panel A first show that violating SEC rules is not associated 
with a significant market response, although the coefficients of the lobbying variables remain negative 
and statistically significant. The negative coefficients of the interaction terms in columns (2) and (4) 
suggest that, on average, the decrease in value associated with higher lobbying expenditures, in response 
to the guilty plea, is greater for firms charged with a SEC violation. For example, from the results 
reported  in  column (4) of  Panel A of Table III,  we note that  a $100,000 increase in lobbying 
expenditures is associated with a decrease in value of about $3.2 million for a firm charged with a SEC 
violation, compared to a $1 million decrease for firms without violation. While the estimated coefficient 
of SEC Action is positive and statistically significant in columns (2) and (4), on average this variable 
does not have a statistically significant impact on returns, as can be observed in columns (1) and (3). 
Next, we use two reputation ranking measures to examine whether firms that have a poor 
reputation for corporate ethics react differently to the Abramoff event. First, in Panel B of Table III, we 
consider the variable Code of Ethics, which ranks firms based on the strength of their policies against 
bribery and corruption, among other unethical practices. We note from the coefficients of the interaction 
terms reported in columns (2) and (4) of Panel B, that the loss in value associated with higher lobbying 
expenditures, in response to the Abramoff event, is greater for firms without a strong ethics code. From 
the estimated coefficient of Lobbying Expenses and Code of Ethics in column (4) of Panel B, we note 
that a $100,000 increase in lobbying expenditures is associated with a loss in value of about $1.7 million 
on average for a firm lacking a strong code of ethics. In contrast, this effect is reversed for a firm with a 
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 strong ethical code, and suggests a gain in value of about $162,000 on average. Hence, the interaction 
term suggests that the market reaction to the value of lobbying following the guilty plea is more negative 
for firms that may be more likely to engage in unethical practices. 
The second group of reputation measures is based on the corporate social responsibility rank of 
firms. We consider the effect of both Concerns and Strengths, where higher values for the Concerns 
variable indicate a worse reputation. From the results reported in Panel C of Table III, we note that the 
coefficients of the interaction between Lobbying Rank and the CSR variables reported in columns (2) 
and  (4)  of  Panel C  are negative and statistically significant. Among  firms  with higher lobbying 
expenses, those with a large number of reputational concerns benefit more from lobbying, since the 
results suggest that these firms experience a greater decrease in value in response to the guilty plea. 
From the coefficient of the interaction between Lobbying Rank and Concerns>P75 in column (4), we 
estimate that a $100,000 increase in lobbying expenditures is associated with a loss in value of about 
$3.8 million on average for firms that score in the 75
th percentile and above of CSR concerns, compared 
to a loss of about $1.6 million on average for firms with fewer concerns. It also appears that concerns 
and strengths do not have a symmetric effect on firm value. Strengths may not be informative because 
firms may strategically implement policies that count as strengths in order to counteract the effects of a 
large number of concerns on their CSR rank. 
C.  Do laws restricting corruption affect value? 
To further investigate whether unethical lobbying practices create shareholder value, we examine 
the stock market reaction to the first lobbying-related bill to be voted on in both chambers of the U.S. 
Congress following the Abramoff event. Since the main objective of this bill was to reduce corruption in 
lobbying, if the value from lobbying arises only from legitimate interactions with policy makers, we 
posit that firms that lobby  should not  be significantly affected by this event.  However, if the bill 
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 increases potential costs of compliance for firms that lobby, then the market reaction may partly reflect 
these costs. Note that we control for firm size and industry, which are likely to be highly correlated with 
the cost of complying with additional regulation. 
We consider the cumulative abnormal returns for our sample firms in the 3-day event window 
around the introduction of the bill in the U.S. Senate on March 1, 2006, the Senate vote on March 29, 
2006, and the House vote on May 23, 2006. The results reported in Table IV suggest that firms with 
higher lobbying expenditures experience a greater decrease in value upon the introduction of the bill in 
the U.S. Senate. For example, compared to firms in the 1
st decile of Lobbying Rank with the lowest 
lobbying expenditures, firms in the 10
th decile with the highest expenditures experience an average a 
decrease in abnormal returns of about 0.6% (column (1)). For the sample of firms that lobby, from the 
results reported in column (4), we note that a $100,000 increase in lobbying expenditures is associated 
with an average decrease of about $0.95 million in value around the event. 
We also examine the announcement returns around the passage of the bill in the U.S. Senate and 
the  House of Representatives  in  the remaining columns  of Table IV, and find consistent  but  less 
statistically significant results. Since the Senate and House votes occurred after the introduction of the 
bill in the Senate, the market may have already incorporated information about the outcome of these 
votes. 
D.  Market response to another corruption event 
We  also  examine  the market response to  a second  corruption scandal involving another 
prominent Washington D.C.  lobbyist,  Paul J. Magliocchetti,  who pleaded guilty to making illegal 
campaign contributions. The first event we consider occurred on November 25, 2008, when the FBI 
raided the offices of the lobbying firm founded by Mr. Magliocchetti, the PMA Group, signaling the 
start of the FBI investigation into possible illegal activity. The second event occurred on March 31, 
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 2009, when the PMA Group officially closed. The results reported in Table V suggest a statistically 
significant and negative market response for firms that spend more on lobbying, in the 3-day event 
window surrounding the raid of Mr. Magliocchetti’s offices. We do not find evidence of a significant 
market response to the closing of the lobbying firm. Although weaker than the effect of the Abramoff 
event, the significant market response to another lobbyist scandal provides additional support for the 
hypothesis that lobbying creates shareholder value. 
E.  Do opaque firms benefit more from lobbying? 
Theory  suggests that  lobbying  allows  experts  to  communicate specialized information to 
overburdened policy makers (Grossman and Helpman, 2001), but recent empirical research shows that 
lobbyists are valued more for their political connections than their issue-based knowledge (Bertrand, 
Bombardini, and Trebbi (2011), Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and, Fons-Rosen (2011)). To investigate the 
information  role of lobbying,  we  examine if  opaque firms,  characterized by greater  information 
asymmetry, benefit more from their lobbying activities. 
We use three firm-level measures of asset opacity and accounting transparency: The ratio of a 
firm’s intangible assets to  total assets (Intangibles/Assets);  the  ratio of R&D expenditures to total 
expenses (R&D/Total Expenses); and an earnings management measure based on Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki (2003). The results are reported in Table VI. The estimated coefficients of the interaction terms 
between the lobbying variables and the opaqueness measures suggest that opaque firms do not benefit 
more from lobbying. 
However,  the  absence  of empirical evidence for the informational role of lobbying  in our 
analysis does not imply that lobbying has no such a role. Instead, it may be the case that the market 
viewed the Abramoff scandal  as one that  primarily  affected  firms  engaged  in  unethical  lobbying 
activities, rather than firms that lobby for a legitimate informational purpose. 
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 V.  Robustness Checks 
In this section we conduct a number of tests to investigate the robustness of our results to 
alternative specifications and interpretations.  First, to corroborate that we capture the effect of Mr. 
Abramoff’s guilty plea, and not confounding events, we examine the impact of the guilty plea on firms 
that employed Jack Abramoff or his close associates as lobbyists. The results reported in Table VII show 
that such firms experienced a greater decrease in value in response to the guilty plea. Note that the 
coefficient of Lobbying Expenses remains negative and statistically significant, indicating that among 
the sample of firms that lobby, those that did not use Mr. Abramoff or his associates as lobbyists, also 
experience a significant decrease in value. Hence, the results show that the scandal limited the political 
access of all lobbying firms, and not only those directly connected to the lobbyist. 
Second,  we  implement  a propensity score matching method to perform a matched sample 
analysis and investigate the robustness of our results to this alternative specification. Specifically, we 
construct a one-to-one matched sample where for each firm that lobbies, we identify a comparable non-
lobbying firm based on size, market to book, and industry. For this matching process we include all non-
lobbying firms in the S&P 1500 index during our sample period. Matching is based on the estimated 
probability of lobbying for each firm and follows the method of nearest neighbor  matching  with 
replacement. The CAR of each lobbying firm is then adjusted by the CAR of the matched non-lobbying 
firm. The results reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table VIII, Panel A, suggest that our results are 
robust for both Lobbying Rank and Lobbying Expenses. 
In addition, we adopt a generalized propensity score methodology developed by Hirano and 
Imbens (2004),  designed for settings with a continuous treatment,  such as  the amount of lobbying 
expenditures. This method allows us to reduce the bias that may arise from systematic differences in 
firms with different lobbying expenditures. We restrict the analysis to the lobbying sample and match 
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 each firm, based on firm size, market to book, and industry classification, to a firm in a different “bin” 
of lobbying expenditures. We estimate the treatment effect, or the change in the outcome variable for a 
unit change in the treatment variable, and plot the results in Figure IV.
19 The treatment variable (t) is 
Log (Lobbying Expenses) and the outcome variable is cumulative abnormal returns around the guilty 
plea. The horizontal axis of the figure shows different levels of the treatment variable, while the vertical 
axis shows the change in the conditional expectation of the CARs. The middle line of the graph indicates 
the change in cumulative abnormal returns for a one unit increase in Log(Lobbying Expenses), and is 
negative. Hence, consistent with our prior results, the graph suggests that firms with higher lobbying 
expenditures experience a greater decrease in value compared to otherwise similar firms that spend less 
on lobbying.  The  Low  Bound  and  Upper  Bound  plot the 95% confidence interval  generated  with 
bootstrapped standard errors, and, since 0 is not in this interval, indicate that the negative treatment 
effect is statistically significant. 
As an alternative robustness check, we control for the relative importance of lobbying 
expenditures as a share of total expenditures at the firm level. The results are robust to this alternative 
measure, as described in column (3) of Panel A, Table VIII. 
We also  investigate  whether our results may be  driven by calendar time effects,  given the 
proximity of the plea date to the New Year’s Day holiday. In Table VIII, Panel B, we examine the 
market reaction on the same event date in the two years prior and the year after our event year. We do 
not find any significant association between the lobbying activity of a firm and its market value during 
this event window in other years. 
Firms that seek to influence politicians may also do so by contributing to electoral campaigns, or 
through their political connections. We collect data from the Center for Responsive Politics for the 2004 
19 The estimation of the generalized propensity score method uses the algorithm and program developed by Bia and Mattei 
(2008). 
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                                                 and 2006 election cycles to calculate campaign contributions made by the individual employees and 
Political Action Committees  of firms. The results described in Panel  C  of Table VIII  suggest that 
political contributions are not significantly related to abnormal returns  around Abramoff’s plea. 
However, the lobbying variables retain their sign and statistical significance, suggesting that lobbying is 
not a proxy for campaign contributions. 
Another potential channel for political influence is through a firm’s political connections. Using 
data on the political connections of corporate boards, we examine the market response for firms around 
the plea. From the results reported in column (2) of Panel C, we note that the party affiliation of board 
members is not significantly associated with a change in value, although the coefficient of Lobbying 
Rank remains negative and statistically significant. For the lobbying sample in columns (5) and (6) we 
note that firms connected to the Republican Party experience significantly negative abnormal returns 
compared to firms connected to the Democratic Party, and firms without connections. This may be due 
to the fact that the Abramoff scandal mostly implicated government officials affiliated with the 
Republican Party, and anecdotal evidence suggests that Republicans faced greater scrutiny following the 
scandal.
20 Note that the coefficients of the lobbing variables remain negative and statistically significant 
after controlling for political connections, suggesting that lobbying is not a proxy for partisan affiliations 
and/or political preferences. 
Since the decision to lobby and its value implications are likely to be affected by industry-
specific factors such as government regulation and competitive structure, we establish the robustness of 
our results to industry regulation and competition. In columns (1), (3), and (4) of Panel D we include a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in a regulated industry (public utilities, banking, 
finance, or insurance). The results confirm  that lobbying firms experience a decrease in value in 
20 The Washington Post reported that “Republicans worry…that Abramoff, known for his close ties to (former Republican 
Speaker of the House), DeLay, mostly implicates Republicans as a result of his plea agreement.” 
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                                                 response to the Abramoff event after controlling for the presence of regulated industries. To control for 
the competitive structure of industries, we estimate our  main specifications controlling for the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) based on the Fama and French 12 industry categories.
21 The results 
reported in Panel D suggest that lobbying expenditures are not just a proxy for industry concentration, 
since the estimated coefficients of the lobbying variables retain their sign and statistical significance. 
Lastly, in Panel E, we control for state-level corruption measures, based on the location of the 
firm’s headquarters.  We use two measures of corruption at the state level: first, the BGA Index, 
measuring  the relative strength of states’ laws that promote integrity, where higher  values of this 
variable indicate stronger laws. The second  measure,  Corruption Rate,  captures  the number of 
convictions of public officials for corruption relative to the average population of the state. The results 
reported in Panel E show that firms located in states with below median strength in laws promoting 
public integrity, and higher than the  sample  median number of convictions of public officials, 
experience a greater decrease in market returns in response to the Abramoff event. Moreover, the 
lobbying variables retain their sign and statistical significance. 
VI.  Conclusion 
Despite the fact that corporations and interest groups spent about $30 billion lobbying policy 
makers over the last decade, there is a lack of robust empirical evidence on whether firms’ lobbying 
expenditures create value for their shareholders. Moreover, while the public perception of the lobbying 
process is that it involves unethical behavior that may bias rather than inform politicians, this is difficult 
to show since unethical practices are not typically observable. 
Our main contribution is to identify events that exogenously affect corporate lobbying. Using the 
guilty plea by top lobbyist Jack Abramoff to bribery, and legislation that attempted to reduce corruption 
21 Our results are robust if we use 2-digit SIC codes for industry classification purposes instead of the Fama and French 12 
industry groups to construct HHI. 
27 
 
                                                 in lobbying, as exogenous negative shocks to the ability of firms to lobby, we find that firms that lobby 
more experience a significant decrease in market value around these events. 
We also examine whether lobbying adds value simply by informing politicians, or whether the 
value to firms partly arises from lobbyists using unethical means to influence policy makers. Using SEC 
enforcement actions against firms for violations such as insider trading, accounting fraud, and bribery to 
identify firms that are more likely to engage in unethical practices, we show that, the value loss 
associated with lobbying activity around the guilty plea, is greater for firms charged with violating SEC 
rules. 
Based on the argument that firms with weak policies against bribery and corruption may be more 
likely to engage in unethical practices, we also show that the lobbying-related loss of value around the 
scandal is significantly greater among firms with a weak code of ethics. We obtain similar results for 
firms with a poor reputation for corporate social responsibility. Significantly, we also find that firms that 
lobby more experience a greater decrease in value in response to legislative efforts to restrict corruption 
in lobbying. Taken together, our results suggest that lobbying is valuable to shareholders and that part of 
the value from lobbying may arise from potentially unethical arrangements between firms and policy 
makers. 
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 Appendix I 
 
Event  Date 
Jack Abramoff pleads guilty  3-January-2006 
Introduction of the Bill by T. Lott  1-March-2006 
Senate votes the Bill by T. Lott  29-March-2006 
House votes the Bill by T. Lott  23-May-2006 
Initial raid of PMA  25-November-2008 
PMA closed  31-March-2009 
 
 
Appendix II 
Bill S.2349 
Latest Title: 527 Reform Act of 2006 
Sponsor: Sen Lott, Trent [MS] (introduced 3/1/2006) Cosponsors (None) 
Related Bills: H.RES.772, H.R.513, H.R.4575, H.R.4667, H.R.4948, H.R.4975, H.R.4988, H.R.5677, 
S.RES.525, S.2128 
Latest Major Action: 5/23/2006 Resolving differences -- Senate actions. Status: Senate disagreed to 
House amendments, requested a conference, and appointed conferees. Lott; Stevens; McConnell; Dodd; 
Inouye. 
Latest Action: 5/23/2006 Message on Senate action sent to the House. 
 
SUMMARY AS OF: 
5/23/2006--Passed House amended. (There are 3 other summaries) 
 
Lobbying Transparency and Accountability Act of 2006 - 527 Reform Act of 2006 - Title I: Enhancing 
Lobbying Disclosure - (Sec. 101) Amends the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) to require: (1) 
quarterly instead of semiannual filing of lobbying disclosures reports; (2) electronic filing; and (3) 
maintenance of certain lobbying disclosure information in an electronic data base, available to the public 
free of charge over the Internet. 
 
(Sec. 104) Extends from two years to seven years before the first date of acting as a lobbyist the look-
back period for mandatory registration disclosure by a registered lobbyist of service by any of its 
employees as a covered executive or legislative branch official. 
 
(Sec. 105) Requires registered lobbyists to include in their mandatory semiannual reports specified 
information about any contributions to federal candidates or related committees, gifts to covered 
legislative branch officials, and funds contributed to an entity named for, established, financed, 
maintained, or controlled by a covered legislative branch official. Exempts from this reporting 
requirement any payments or reimbursements made from funds already required to be reported under the 
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971(FECA). 
 
(Sec. 106) Increases from $50,000 to $100,000 the civil penalty for knowing failure to remedy a 
defective lobbyist filing or comply with any LDA requirement. Amends the federal criminal code to 
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 establish criminal penalties of fines or imprisonment for up to: (1) three years for knowing and willful 
failure to comply with LDA requirements; or (2) five years for knowing, willful, and corrupt failure to 
do so. 
 
(Sec. 107) Subjects registered lobbyists, employees, and clients to civil penalties of up to $50,000 for 
offering gifts to a covered legislative branch official of the House in knowing violation of House rules. 
 
Title II: Slowing the Revolving Door - (Sec. 201) Amends the federal criminal code to require former 
Members of the House, officers, or employees to be notified of certain post-employment restrictions. 
 
(Sec. 202) Amends the Code of Official Conduct to require public disclosure by Members of the House 
of employment negotiations. Urges them to refrain from voting on any pending legislative measure if 
such negotiation creates a conflict of interest. (Sec. 203) Amends the Code to prohibit a Member, 
officer, or employee of the House from wrongfully influencing, on a partisan basis, an entity's 
employment decisions or practices. 
 
Title III: Suspension of Privately-Funded Travel; Curbing Lobbyists Gifts - (Sec. 301) Prohibits 
Members, officers or employees of the House from accepting a gift of travel (including any 
transportation, lodging, and meals during such travel) from any private source unless the House 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct (Committee) pre-certifies in writing that such travel 
complies with House rules and standards of conduct. 
 
(Sec. 302) Requires the Committee to report its recommendations to the House Committee on Rules on 
changes to Rule XXV (Limitations on Outside Earned Income and Acceptance of Gifts) of the Rules of 
the House regarding exceptions to such Rule. 
 
(Sec. 303) Prohibits registered lobbyists from traveling on flights as passengers or crew members of 
aircrafts not licensed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to operate for compensation or hire 
(corporate flights), if a Member, officer, or employee is a passenger or crew member on such flights. 
 
(Sec. 304) Amends Rule XXV to declare that a gift of a ticket to a sporting or entertainment event shall 
be the face value of the ticket, or equivalent. 
 
Title IV: Oversight of Lobbying and Enforcement - (Sec. 401) Requires the Office of Inspector 
General of the House (OIG) to: (1) have access to all lobbyists' disclosure information received by the 
Clerk of the House; and (2) randomly audit such information to ensure LDA compliance. Authorizes the 
OIG to refer potential violations by lobbyists of LDA to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for 
disciplinary action. 
 
(Sec. 402) Requires the Inspector General to review on an ongoing basis, and report annually to 
Congress about, the lobbyist registration and disclosure enforcement activities of the Clerk of the House. 
 
Title V: Institutional Reforms - (Sec. 501) Makes it out of order to consider appropriations measures 
containing earmarks if the legislation, its accompanying reports, or managers' joint explanatory 
statements do not list such earmarks or name the requesting Members. 
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 (Sec. 502) Amends Rule II (Other Officers and Officials) of the Rules of the House to prohibit the Chief 
Administrative Officer from paying compensation to House employees for any pay period during which 
the employee is not in compliance with the applicable requirements of regulations promulgated pursuant 
to Rule XI (Procedures of Committees and Unfinished Business). Amends such Rule XI to require the 
Committee to establish a program of regular ethics training for House employees and promulgate related 
regulations. 
 
(Sec. 503) Requires the Committee to publish biennially an up-to-date ethics manual for Members, 
officers, and employees. 
 
Title VI: Forfeiture of Retirement Benefits - (Sec. 601) Amends federal civil service law regarding 
the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees' Retirement System (FERS) to 
exclude from retirement accounting any service as a Member of Congress of an individual finally 
convicted of a felony involving bribery of public officials and witnesses, conspiracy to commit an 
offense or to defraud the United States, or acting as an agent of a foreign principal. Entitles such 
individual, all the same, to so much of his or her lump-sum credit as is attributable to such service. 
 
Title VII: Leadership PACS -  (Sec. 701) Amends FECA to permit a leadership political action 
committee (PAC) to use its funds for: (1) otherwise authorized expenditures in connection with 
campaigns for election for federal office; (2) tax deductible charitable contributions; and (3) transfers to 
a national, state, or local committee of a political party (subject to applicable FECA limitations). Defines 
leadership PAC as a political committee directly or indirectly established, maintained, or controlled by a 
candidate for federal office or an individual holding federal office, but which is not an authorized 
committee of the candidate or individual. Excludes from the meaning of leadership PAC, however, any 
political committee of a political party. 
 
Title VIII: Ethics Training for Lobbyists - (Sec. 801) Requires the Committee, during each Congress, 
to provide an eight-hour ethics training course to registered lobbyists. Subjects registered lobbyists who 
fail to complete such course at least once during each Congress to LDA penalties to the same extent as 
for LDA noncompliance. 
 
Title IX: Miscellaneous Provisions -  (Sec. 901) Amends the federal criminal code subjecting 
individuals to fines and penalties for bribery of public officials and witnesses to include as an "official 
act" (which might be influenced in violation of such law) any decision or action on an earmark. 
 
Title X: 527 Reform Act of 2006 - 527 Reform Act of 2006 - (Sec. 1002) Amends the Federal Election 
Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) to include in the definition of political committee any applicable 527 
organization. (Thus subjects such organizations to the requirements of the Act. A 527 organization, as 
defined by section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, is an organization, not controlled by or involving a 
particular candidate for office, whose function is to influence or attempt to influence the selection, 
nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any federal, state, or local public office or 
office in a political organization, or the election of presidential or vice-presidential electors, whether or 
not such individual or electors are selected, nominated, elected, or appointed.) Requires the organization 
to give notice to the Secretary of the Treasury under section 527 that it is to be treated as an organization 
described in section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code. Except from the definition of 527 organization 
under FECA a committee, club, association, or other group of persons (organization) which: (1) is a 527 
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 organization under the Internal Revenue Code; (2) is organized, operated, and makes disbursements 
exclusively for paying certain tax-deductible business expenses or expenses of a certain kind of political 
newsletter fund; (3) consists solely of candidates for or individuals holding state or local office, but only 
if the organization refers only to one or more nonfederal candidates or applicable state or local issues in 
all of its voter drive activities, without reference to any federal candidate; or (4) whose election or 
nomination activities relate exclusively to elections where no candidate for federal office appears on the 
ballot, or to influencing the selection, nomination, election, or appointment of one or more candidates to 
nonfederal offices or individuals to non-elected offices, or influencing one or more applicable state or 
local issues. Denies the treatment of any such organization as meeting such exclusivity requirement if it 
makes disbursements aggregating more than $1,000 for: (1) a public communication that promotes, 
supports, attacks, or opposes a clearly identified candidate for federal office during the one year period 
ending on the date of the general election for the office sought by the candidate (or if a runoff election is 
held with respect to such general election, on the date of the runoff election); and (2) any voter drive 
activity during a calendar year, except a drive in only one state with no reference to federal office 
candidates. 
 
(Sec. 1003) Sets forth rules for allocation and funding for certain expenses relating to federal and 
nonfederal activities, including payments of 100% or 50% from a federal account in several specified 
circumstances. Limits individual donations to a political committee that is a separate segregated fund or 
non connected committee to an annual aggregate of $25,000 for its qualified nonfederal account. 
 
(Sec. 1004) Repeals the limit on the amount of party expenditures on behalf of candidates in general 
elections. Raises the limits for House and Senate candidates facing wealthy opponents. 
 
(Sec. 1006) Prescribes special rules for actions brought for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge 
the constitutionality of any provision of this Act. Requires such an action to be filed in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia, and to be heard by a three-judge panel. Makes any final decision by 
the panel reviewable only by the U.S. Supreme Court. Authorizes Members of Congress to: (1) bring an 
action challenging the constitutionality of this Act; and (2) intervene in any action in which the 
constitutionality of any provision of this Act is raised. Applies such special rules only to actions brought 
on or before December 31, 2008. 
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 Appendix III 
 
Variable  Description 
CAR(-1;+1) in %  The cumulative abnormal return of each firm calculated over a 
3-day window centered at the respective event date. The 
abnormal returns are in percentage. Abnormal returns are 
market-adjusted using the CRSP value-weighted index. 
Lobbying Expenses (in ‘000s)  Continuous variable that measures the amount of money (in 
thousands of $’s) spent on lobbying by a firm in the 3-year 
period 2003-2005 (included). It is constructed as the sum of 
lobbying expenses made by each firm over this period. Source: 
OpenSecrets.org 
Lobbying Expenses / Total 
Expenses 
Continuous variable that measures the amount of money spent 
on lobbying by a firm in the 3-year period 2003-2005 as a 
fraction of the total expenses incurred by the firm during this 
period. Total expenses are defined as the sum of Advertising 
Expenses, Interest Expense, R&D Expense, and Selling, 
General, and Administrative Expense. 
Lobbying Rank  Ordinal variable that measures the rank of each firm in terms of 
lobbying activity. To construct this variable, we split all firms 
with non-zero lobbying over the period 2003-2005 into 10 
deciles. The variable is increasing in lobbying expenditures. 
Decile 10 (Decile 1) includes firms with the largest (smallest) 
lobbying expenses. Lobbying Rank takes the value of the decile 
in which a firm falls based on its lobbying expenses. All firms 
which have no lobbying activities in the period 2003-2005 
(included) are assigned a lobbying rank of 0. 
Log(Lobbying Expenses)  Natural logarithm of the sum of the lobbying expenses (in 
thousands of $’s) made by a firm during the 3-year period 2003-
2005 (included). 
Assets  Book value of the firm’s total assets as of the end of year 2005. 
Expressed in thousands of $’s. 
MB Ratio  Continuous variable of the ratio of the firm’s market value of 
equity to its book value. Market value is constructed as price 
times shares outstanding. Book value is the book value of equity 
and deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus the book 
value of preferred. Book value of preferred stock is redemption, 
liquidation, or par value (in that order), while book value of 
equity is stockholders’ equity, common equity plus par value of 
preferred, or book value of total assets minus total liabilities (in 
that order). The measure is for 2005. 
Industry FE FF49  Indicator variable for each of the industry groups following the 
Fama-French 49 industry classification. Source: Kenneth 
French’s website. 
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 Concerns  The sum of all concerns raised by KLD across 7 dimensions of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR): Community Relations, 
Corporate Governance, Diversity, Human Rights, Employee 
Relations, Products, and Environment. The score is for 2005. 
Source: KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. 
Concerns>P75  Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the Concerns of a 
firm’s CSR practices exceed the sample’s 75
th percentile, and 0 
otherwise. 
Strengths  The sum of all strengths identified by KLD across 7 dimensions 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR): Community Relations, 
Corporate Governance, Diversity, Human Rights, Employee 
Relations, Products, and Environment. The score is for 2005. 
Source: KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. 
Strengths>P75  Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the Strengths of a 
firm’s CSR practices exceed the sample’s 75
th percentile, and 0 
otherwise 
Code of Ethics  Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the score by the 
firm is “Advanced” or “Intermediate” on both survey questions: 
“Does the Company have a code of ethics and, if so, how 
comprehensive is it?” & “Does the Company have a system for 
implementing a code of ethics and, if so, how comprehensive is 
it?”, and 0 otherwise. The score is for 2005. Source: EIRIS 
Team Abramoff  Ratio of the number of close associates of Jack Abramoff 
employed by the firm during 2003-2005 to the total number of 
lobbyists employed by each firm during that period. 
D(Team Abramoff)  Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a member of the 
close associates of Jack Abramoff has been employed by the 
firm during 2003-2005, and 0 otherwise. 
SEC Action  Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the Securities and 
Exchange Commission has brought a civil lawsuit, investigation 
and administrative proceeding, or enforcement action against 
the firm during the 5-year period 2001-2005; and 0 otherwise. 
Source: SEC Litigation and Enforcement Releases sections. 
High/Low Rep  “High Rep” firms meet all of the following three conditions: 1) 
no SEC Action against firm, 2) firm has a Code of Ethics, and 
3) firm’s Concerns do not exceed the 75
th  percentile.  “Low 
Rep” firms meet all of the following three conditions: 1) SEC 
Action against firm, 2) firm does not have a Code of Ethics, and 
3) firm’s Concerns exceed the 75
th percentile. 
Contributions (in ‘000s)  Continuous variable that measures the  amount of money (in 
thousands of $’s) spent on political campaign contributions by a 
firm in the 3-year period 2003-2005 (included). This includes 
the amount spend during the 2004 cycle and half of the 2006 
cycle. It is measured as the sum of all campaign contributions 
through PACs and individuals made by each firm over this 
period. Source: OpenSecrets.org 
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 Contributions Rank  Ordinal variable that measures the rank of each firm in terms of 
political campaign contributions. To construct this variable, we 
split all firms over the period 2003-2005 into 10 deciles. The 
variable is increasing in campaign contributions. Decile 10 
(Decile 1) includes firms with the largest (smallest) donations. 
Contributions Rank takes the value of the decile in which a firm 
falls based on its campaign contributions. 
Intangibles/Assets  Book value of a  firm’s intangible assets scaled by the book 
value of its total assets. The measure is for 2005. 
Low Transparency  Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm’s 
Transparency Score is below the sample’s 25
th percentile score 
and 0 otherwise, where Transparency Score is defined as the 
ratio of the standard deviation of a firm’s operating income to 
the standard deviation of the firm’s cash flow. Standard 
deviations are estimated over 5-year period ending 2005 
(included). Cash flow is calculated as operating income minus 
accruals, where accruals are (∆Total Current Assets – ∆Cash) – 
(∆Total  Current  Liabilities  –  ∆Short-term Debt –  ∆Taxes 
Payable)  –  Depreciation Expense. Source: Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki (2003). 
R&D/Total Expenses  Continuous variable that measures firm’s R&D expenditures as 
a fraction of its total expenses. Total expenses are defined as the 
sum of Advertising Expenses, Interest Expense, R&D Expense, 
and Selling, General, and Administrative Expense. The measure 
is for 2005. 
HHI  Continuous variable that measures industry concentration at the 
Fama and French 12 industry classification level. The measure 
is the equally-weighted sum of squared sales-based market 
shares of all firms on the Compustat tape in that industry. The 
measure is for 2005. 
Democrat on Board  Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is 
connected to Democratic Party or to both Democratic and 
Republican parties, and 0 otherwise (if the firm is connected 
only to Republican Party, or if it  is not connected). Source: 
Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009). 
Republican on Board  Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is 
connected to Republican Party or to both Republican and 
Democratic parties, and 0 otherwise (if the firm is connected 
only to Democratic Party, or if it is not connected). Source: 
Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009). 
Regulated Industry  Indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is in a 
regulated industry and 0 otherwise. Regulated industries are 
industries with the following 2-digit SIC codes: 40, 48, 49, 60, 
61, and 63. 
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 BGA Index  BGA Index is constructed by the Better Government Association 
and measures the relative strength of the states’ laws that 
promote integrity. Higher scores indicate stronger laws and 
better citizen protection. We use the index of the firm’s 
headquarters state as of 2002. BGA Index < Median  is an 
indicator that takes the value of 1 if the state has below-median 
index, and 0 otherwise. 
Corruption  Corruption Rate  is based on Glaeser and Saks (2006) and 
measures the number of convictions of public officials for 
corruption during 1976-2002 relative to the average population 
in the state. Corruption Rate > Median is an indicator that takes 
the value of 1 if the state has above-median rate, and 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
Appendix IV 
 
Lobbying 
Rank 
Mean Lobbying 
Expenses (in ‘000s) 
Min Lobbying 
Expenses (in ‘000s) 
Max Lobbying 
Expenses (in ‘000s) 
0  $0  $0  $0 
1  $66.6  $10.0  $120.0 
2  $205.3  $130.0  $280.0 
3  $403.1  $284.0  $520.0 
4  $644.8  $540.0  $880.0 
5  $1,120.8  $900.0  $1,340.0 
6  $1,702.2  $1,356.7  $2,005.0 
7  $2,647.4  $2,066.3  $3,320.0 
8  $4,049.6  $3,350.0  $5,050.0 
9  $7,132.9  $5,267.2  $10,520.0 
10  $20,591.3  $10,640.0  $55,960.0 
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 Figure I 
 
The figure shows the daily number of articles returned from a Factiva key-word search over the period 
January 2004-December 2006. The search imposes the following conditions: 1) at least two mentions of 
“Abramoff” and “lobb*” and one of the following terms: “accus*”, “fraud*”, “investig*”, “regula*”, 
“reform*” “restric*”, “scand*”, “strict*”, “unlaw*”, and 2) the article contains at least 1000 words. 
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 Figure II: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Abramoff’s Guilty Plea 
 
This figure shows the median cumulative abnormal returns for the lobbying and non-lobbying firms on 
each day during a 10-day event window (-5,+5) centered at the date of Abramoff’s guilty plea (January 
3, 2006). The cumulative abnormal return of a firm on each day during the event window is the sum of 
the daily abnormal returns experienced by this firm between this day and day -5. 
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 Figure III 
 
The figure shows the difference in lobbying expenditures between two groups of firms during the period 
2005 to 2007. In Panel A, the dashed (dotted) line represents the difference in the mean (median) of the 
lobbying expenditures of firms with a negative market reaction around Abramoff’s plea and firms with a 
positive market reaction. In Panel B, the dashed (dotted) line represents the difference in the mean 
(median) of the lobbying expenditures of “Low Rep” and “High Rep” firms. “High Rep” firms meet all 
of the following three conditions: 1) no SEC Action against firm, 2) firm has a Code of Ethics, and 3) 
firm’s Concerns do not exceed the 75
th percentile. “Low Rep” firms meet all of the following three 
conditions: 1) SEC Action against firm, 2) firm does not have a Code of Ethics, and 3) firm’s Concerns 
exceed the 75
th percentile. The semi-annual lobbying expenses of each firm are scaled by its semi-
annual lobbying expenses during the 1
st half of 2005. 
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 Figure IV: Generalized Propensity Score with Continuous Treatment 
 
The figure shows the estimated treatment effect function of the generalized propensity score 
analysis, along with its 95% confidence interval obtained from 500 bootstrap replications. The 
treatment variable (t) is Log(Lobbying Expenses). The horizontal axis shows different levels of 
the treatment variable, while the vertical axis shows the change in the conditional expectation of 
the outcome variable (cumulative abnormal returns  around Abramoff’s guilty  plea)  given 
treatment and generalized propensity score for a unit change in the treatment variable. 
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 Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
The table reports summary statistics for the sample of firms used in the event study analysis of Jack Abramoff’s guilty plea (January 3, 2006). 
Panel A provides summary statistics for the entire sample of firms, while panels B and C show summary statistics for the sub-samples of 
lobbying and non-lobbying firms, respectively. All variables are described in Appendix III. 
 
Panel A: All Firms  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  25
th Perc  75
th Perc  Maximum  Number of 
Firms 
Lobbying Expenses (in ‘000s)  2,632.2  5,874.2  0  0  2,422.0  55,960.0  617 
Lobbying Rank  3.74  3.50  0  0  7  10  617 
Assets (in ‘000s)  22,248,496  32,312,812  1,366,980  3,514,900  25,307,020  124,615,160  617 
Log(Assets)  16.09  1.28  14.13  15.07  17.05  18.64  617 
MB Ratio  3.16  2.04  0.94  1.69  3.97  8.88  617 
Concerns  3.31  2.54  0  2  4  16  608 
Strengths  3.04  3.07  0  1  4  18  608 
Concerns>P75  0.25  0.43  0  0  0  1  608 
Strengths>P75  0.24  0.42  0  0  0  1  608 
Code of Ethics  0.31  0.46  0  0  1  1  510 
BGA Index  50.22  8.13  33.40  44.00  56.80  67.40  596 
Corruption Rate  0.29  0.11  0.07  0.21  0.37  0.51  596 
Republican on Board  0.20  0.40  0  0  0  1  617 
Democrat on Board  0.17  0.37  0  0  0  1  617 
SEC Action   0.10  0.30  0  0  0  1  617 
Regulated Industry  0.21  0.40  0  0  0  1  617 
Contributions Rank  5.54  2.86  1  3  8  10  617 
Contributions (in ‘000s)  405.4  779.5  0  25.0  435.0  8,354.5  617 
Low Transparency  0.25  0.43  0  0  1  1  591 
R&D/Total Expenses  0.07  0.11  0  0  0.12  0.33  614 
Intangibles/Assets  0.17  0.18  0  0.02  0.29  0.57  617 
HHI (FF12)  2.24  1.54  1.14  1.17  2.50  7.74  617 
CAR(-1;+1) in %  0.00  2.43  -5.44  -1.70  1.30  8.77  617 
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 Table I continued 
Panel B: Lobbying Sample  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  25
th Perc  75
th Perc  Maximum  Number of 
Firms 
Lobbying Expenses (in ‘000)  3,857.6  6,772.7  10.0  380.0  3,900.0  55,960.0  421 
Log(Lobbying Expenses)  7.09  1.70  2.30  5.94  8.27  10.93  421 
Lobbying Rank  5.48  2.90  1  3  8  10  421 
Lobbying Expenses/Total  0.003  0.044  0.000  0.0001  0.0009  0.902  420 
Assets (in ‘000s)  26,931,753  35,219,670  1,366,980  4,895,170  30,304,000  124,615,160  421 
Log(Assets)  16.38  1.23  14.13  15.40  17.23  18.64  421 
MB Ratio  3.15  2.06  0.94  1.68  3.99  8.88  421 
Concerns  3.88  2.66  0  2  5  16  414 
Strengths  3.63  3.33  0  1  5  18  414 
Concerns>P75  0.23  0.42  0  0  0  1  414 
Strengths>P75  0.22  0.41  0  0  0  1  414 
Code Ethics  0.35  0.48  0  0  1  1  367 
Team Abramoff  0.002  0.013  0  0  0  0.222  421 
D(Team Abramoff)  0.045  0.208  0  0  0  1  421 
BGA Index  49.72  8.01  33.40  44.00  56.80  67.40  402 
Corruption Rate  0.29  0.11  0.07  0.21  0.37  0.51  402 
Republican on Board  0.25  0.43  0  0  1  1  421 
Democrat on Board  0.22  0.42  0  0  0  1  421 
SEC Action  0.13  0.33  0  0  0  1  421 
Regulated Industry  0.22  0.41  0  0  0  1  421 
Contributions Rank  6.52  2.58  1  5  9  10  421 
Contributions (in 000’s)  546.7  892.9  0  70.5  583.5  8,354.5  421 
Low Transparency  0.25  0.43  0  0  0  1  414 
R&D/Total Expenses  0.07  0.11  0  0  0.13  0.33  419 
Intangibles/Assets  0.17  0.17  0  0.03  0.29  0.57  421 
HHI (FF12)  2.31  1.62  1.14  1.17  2.50  7.74  421 
CAR(-1;+1) in %  -0.01  2.46  -5.44  -1.75  1.27  8.35  421 
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 Table I continued 
Panel C: Non-Lobbying Sample  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum  25
th Perc  75
th Perc  Maximum  Number of 
Firms 
Assets (in ‘000s)  12,189,052  21,853,889  1,366,980  2,116,130  9,935,230  124,615,160  196 
Log(Assets)  15.47  1.16  14.13  14.57  16.11  18.64  196 
MB Ratio  3.17  1.99  0.94  1.70  3.94  8.88  196 
Concerns  2.08  1.72  0  1  3  13  194 
Strengths  1.78  1.88  0  0  2  14  194 
Concerns>P75  0.07  0.26  0  0  0  1  194 
Strengths>P75  0.09  0.29  0  0  0  1  194 
Code of Ethics  0.20  0.40  0  0  0  1  143 
BGA Index  51.25  8.31  33.40  44.00  56.80  67.40  194 
Corruption Rate  0.29  0.11  0.07  0.21  0.37  0.46  194 
Republican on Board  0.10  0.30  0  0  0  1  196 
Democrat on Board  0.05  0.22  0  0  0  1  196 
SEC Action  0.05  0.21  0  0  0  1  196 
Regulated Industry  0.18  0.38  0  0  0  1  196 
Contributions Rank  3.45  2.28  1  2  5  10  196 
Contributions (in ‘000s)  101.7  257.3  0  5.5  90.8  1,995.0  196 
Low Transparency  0.26  0.44  0  0  1  1  177 
R&D/Total Expenses  0.07  0.11  0  0  0.12  0.33  195 
Intangibles/Assets  0.17  0.18  0  0.01  0.28  0.57  196 
HHI (FF12)  2.09  1.34  1.14  1.17  2.50  7.74  196 
CAR(-1;+1) in %  0.02  2.38  -5.21  -1.54  1.39  8.77  196 
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 Table II: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Abramoff’s Guilty Plea 
 
Results for the full sample of lobbying and non-lobbying firms are reported in columns (1) and (2), and 
for the sample of firms that lobby in columns (3)-(6). All variables are described in Appendix III. P-
values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
   All Firms  Lobbying Sample 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.081***  -0.055*  -0.144***  -0.117**     
  (0.001)  (0.071)  (0.001)  (0.017)      Log(Lobbying Expenses)          -0.242***  -0.194** 
          (0.001)  (0.022) 
Log(Assets)    -0.130    -0.097    -0.106 
    (0.195)    (0.465)    (0.431) 
MB Ratio    0.023    0.124*    0.124* 
    (0.681)    (0.064)    (0.065) 
Constant  -1.994*  -0.067  -1.341  -0.096  -0.403  0.803 
  (0.069)  (0.972)  (0.343)  (0.969)  (0.788)  (0.735) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  617  617  421  421  421  421 
R
2  0.391  0.393  0.447  0.457  0.446  0.456 
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 Table III: Corporate Ethical Reputation and the Value of Lobbying 
 
The table reports the results from an event study examining the cumulative abnormal returns of the 
sample of firms that lobby based on corporate ethical reputation, in the 3-day event window around Jack 
Abramoff’s guilty plea (January 3, 2006). All variables are described in Appendix III. P-values based on 
robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
  Lobbying Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.118**  -0.092*       
  (0.017)  (0.067)      Log(Lobbying Expenses)      -0.197**  -0.153* 
      (0.020)  (0.074) 
Lobbying Rank × SEC Action    -0.186*     
    (0.064)      Log(Lobbying Expenses) × SEC Action        -0.344** 
        (0.034) 
SEC Action  0.203  1.291*  0.218  2.749** 
  (0.524)  (0.079)  (0.495)  (0.035) 
Log(Assets)  -0.101  -0.093  -0.108  -0.096 
  (0.452)  (0.481)  (0.422)  (0.472) 
MB Ratio  0.123*  0.125*  0.123*  0.124* 
  (0.068)  (0.064)  (0.069)  (0.068) 
Constant  -0.115  -0.361  0.780  0.301 
  (0.963)  (0.885)  (0.743)  (0.900) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  421  421  421  421 
R
2  0.457  0.462  0.457  0.463 
 
Panel B 
  Lobbying Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.090*  -0.152***       
  (0.077)  (0.009)      Log(Lobbying Expenses)      -0.161*  -0.261*** 
      (0.075)  (0.010) 
Lobbying Rank × Code of Ethics    0.167**     
    (0.033)      Log(Lobbying Expenses) × Code of Ethics        0.286** 
        (0.040) 
Code of Ethics  -0.388*  -1.396**  -0.380*  -2.501** 
  (0.092)  (0.013)  (0.099)  (0.023) 
Log(Assets)  -0.014  -0.006  -0.010  -0.011 
  (0.924)  (0.965)  (0.943)  (0.939) 
MB Ratio  0.098  0.105  0.101  0.106 
  (0.189)  (0.154)  (0.183)  (0.150) 
Constant  -0.221  -0.109  0.400  1.036 
  (0.929)  (0.965)  (0.867)  (0.661) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  367  367  367  367 
R
2  0.475  0.483  0.475  0.482 
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Panel C 
  Lobbying Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.146***  -0.131**     
  (0.006)  (0.019)      Log(Lobbying Expenses)      -0.247***  -0.240** 
      (0.007)  (0.011) 
Lobbying Rank × Concerns>P75    -0.194**     
    (0.043)      Lobbying Rank × Strengths>P75    0.026     
    (0.829)      Log(Lobbying Expenses) × Concerns>P75        -0.344** 
        (0.039) 
Log(Lobbying Expenses) × Strengths>P75        0.125 
        (0.537) 
Concerns>P75  0.227  1.607**  0.229  2.978** 
  (0.368)  (0.029)  (0.362)  (0.029) 
Strengths>P75  0.451  0.369  0.453  -0.414 
  (0.138)  (0.705)  (0.139)  (0.801) 
Log(Assets)  -0.156  -0.141  -0.164  -0.148 
  (0.273)  (0.324)  (0.262)  (0.306) 
MB Ratio  0.091  0.085  0.090  0.084 
  (0.181)  (0.214)  (0.186)  (0.221) 
Constant  0.947  0.504  2.025  1.627 
  (0.718)  (0.849)  (0.427)  (0.528) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  414  414  414  414 
R
2  0.469  0.474  0.470  0.475 
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 Table IV: Abnormal Returns around Stages of Bill S.2349 
 
The table reports the results from an event study examining the cumulative abnormal returns of firms in 
the 3-day event window around  each of the three stages of the “Lobbying  Accountability and 
Transparency Act of 2006” (Bill S.2349) sponsored by Senator Trent Lott. The three events are: 1) 
Introduction (March 1, 2006), 2) Senate Vote (March 29, 2006), and 3) House Vote (May 23, 2006). 
Results for the full sample of lobbying and non-lobbying firms are reported in columns (1)-(3), and for 
the sample of firms that lobby in columns (4)-(6). All variables are described in Appendix III. P-values 
based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  All Firms  Lobbying Sample 
  Introduction  Senate  House  Introduction  Senate  House 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.068**  -0.038  -0.013          
  (0.036)  (0.214)  (0.681)        Log(Lobbying Expenses)        -0.146*  -0.085  -0.058 
        (0.079)  (0.297)  (0.424) 
Log(Assets)  0.009  -0.152  0.217*  0.031  -0.103  0.208 
  (0.937)  (0.164)  (0.063)  (0.827)  (0.429)  (0.149) 
MB Ratio  0.038  0.134***  0.069  0.059  0.129**  0.107* 
  (0.498)  (0.007)  (0.185)  (0.403)  (0.043)  (0.069) 
Constant  -0.612  1.337  -3.075  -0.177  1.511  -2.479 
  (0.535)  (0.194)  (0.140)  (0.878)  (0.195)  (0.305) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  615  613  607  420  420  412 
R
2  0.331  0.252  0.193  0.341  0.300  0.269 
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 Table V: Response to another corruption scandal 
 
The table shows results from an event study of the cumulative abnormal returns of firms around event 
dates for the corruption scandal involving lobbyist Paul Magliochetti. The event dates are the initial raid 
of his lobbying firm, the PMA Group (November 25, 2008), and the closure of the PMA Group (March 
31, 2009). Results for the full sample of lobbying and non-lobbying firms are reported in columns (1) 
and (2), and for the sample of firms that lobby in columns (3) and (4). All variables are described in 
Appendix III. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  All Firms  Lobbying Sample 
  Nov 25, 2008  Mar 31, 2009  Nov 25, 2008  Mar 31, 2009 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.331*  0.011     
  (0.087)  (0.897)      Log(Lobbying Expenses)      -1.058**  -0.012 
      (0.034)  (0.944) 
Log(Assets)  0.506  0.009  1.001*  0.209 
  (0.37)  (0.965)  (0.094)  (0.401) 
MB Ratio  -0.495**  0.016  -0.282**  0.049 
  (0.027)  (0.863)  (0.046)  (0.681) 
Constant  2.132  -1.178  -1.180  -4.213 
  (0.846)  (0.730)  (0.912)  (0.209) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  561  552  396  390 
R
2  0.481  0.165  0.483  0.179 
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 Table VI: Examining Alternative Explanations 
 
The table shows the results from an event study of the cumulative abnormal returns of lobbying firms in the 3-day event window around Jack 
Abramoff’s guilty plea (January 3, 2006), based on measures of firm opaqueness to examine the informational role of lobbying. The table uses the 
sample of firms that lobby. All variables are described in Appendix III. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Lobbying Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.147**  -0.119**  -0.139**       
  (0.011)  (0.026)  (0.014)        Log(Lobbying Expenses)        -0.244**  -0.205**  -0.220** 
        (0.015)  (0.028)  (0.021) 
Lobbying Rank × Intangibles/Assets  0.188           
  (0.412)            Lobbying Rank × R&D/Total Expenses    -0.036         
    (0.915)          Lobbying Rank × Low Transparency      0.071       
      (0.374)        Log(Lobbying Expenses) × Intangibles/Assets        0.281     
        (0.468)      Log(Lobbying Expenses)×R&D/Total Expenses          -0.006   
          (0.991)    Log(Lobbying Expenses) × Low Transparency            0.103 
            (0.448) 
Intangibles/Assets  -2.079      -3.077     
  (0.145)      (0.273)      R&D/Total Expenses    5.208**      5.163   
    (0.049)      (0.242)    Low Transparency      -0.356      -0.688 
      (0.487)      (0.498) 
Log(Assets)  -0.111  -0.108  -0.101  -0.114  -0.115  -0.117 
  (0.399)  (0.409)  (0.461)  (0.392)  (0.386)  (0.403) 
MB Ratio  0.113*  0.089  0.121*  0.112*  0.088  0.122* 
  (0.093)  (0.208)  (0.073)  (0.097)  (0.211)  (0.072) 
Constant  0.859  0.161  0.041  1.863  1.084  1.115 
  (0.724)  (0.948)  (0.987)  (0.429)  (0.651)  (0.647) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  421  419  414  421  419  414 
R
2  0.461  0.471  0.462  0.461  0.471  0.461 
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 Table VII: Firms Connected to Team Abramoff 
 
The table shows results from an event study of the cumulative abnormal returns of lobbying firms in the 
3-day event window around Jack Abramoff’s guilty plea (January 3, 2006), based on their connections 
to “Team Abramoff”. Results are reported for the sample of firms that lobby. All variables are described 
in Appendix III. P-values based on robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Lobbying Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.109**  -0.114**       
  (0.031)  (0.021)      Log(Lobbying Expenses)      -0.179**  -0.188** 
      (0.038)  (0.028) 
D(Team Abramoff)  -0.671    -0.673   
  (0.104)    (0.103)    Team Abramoff    -14.628***    -14.530*** 
    (0.008)    (0.006) 
Log(Assets)  -0.091  -0.107  -0.099  -0.117 
  (0.490)  (0.423)  (0.455)  (0.389) 
MB Ratio  0.122*  0.110  0.122*  0.110 
  (0.068)  (0.102)  (0.069)  (0.104) 
Constant  -0.209  0.089  0.629  0.976 
  (0.933)  (0.972)  (0.790)  (0.681) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  421  421  421  421 
R
2  0.459  0.462  0.459  0.462 
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 Table VIII: Additional Robustness Checks 
 
The table reports results from robustness tests. Panel A, columns (1) and (2) reports the results from an 
event study of the cumulative abnormal returns of lobbying firms adjusted for the cumulative abnormal 
returns of a matched sample of non-lobbying firms using propensity score methods in the 3-day event 
window around Jack Abramoff’s guilty plea (January 3, 2006). In column (3), the firm’s lobbying 
expenditures are expressed as a fraction of its total expenses. Panels B-D report results using both the 
full sample of non-lobbying and lobbying firms, and the sample of firms that lobby. Panel B reports the 
results from an event study in a 3-day event window around the same date as the guilty plea, January 3, 
but in the years 2005, 2007, and 2008, to control for potential calendar time effects. Panel C controls for 
the campaign contributions made by firms and their employees, and for the political connections of the 
firms’ corporate boards. Panel D controls for industry concentration (HHI) and regulated industries (2-
digit SIC codes 40, 48, 49, 60, 61, and 63). Panel E controls for state-level corruption based on the 
location of the firms’ headquarters. All variables are described in Appendix III. P-values based on robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Propensity Score Matched Sample 
  Lobbying Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.099*       
  (0.055)      Log(Lobbying Expenses)    -0.201**   
    (0.017)    Lobbying Expenses / Total Expenses      -4.604*** 
      (0.001) 
Log(Assets)      -0.300*** 
      (0.004) 
MB Ratio      0.114* 
      (0.096) 
Constant  0.746**  1.622**  2.864 
  (0.042)  (0.015)  (0.176) 
Industry FE FF49  No  No  Yes 
N  421  421  420 
R
2  0.009  0.013  0.453 
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 Panel B: Controlling for Calendar Effects 
  All Firms  Lobbying Sample 
  2004  2005  2007  2004  2005  2007 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Lobbying Rank  0.021  -0.031  0.025          
  (0.599)  (0.196)  (0.488)        Log(Lobbying Expenses)         -0.019  0.005  -0.009 
         (0.849)  (0.929)  (0.911) 
Log(Assets)  -0.118  0.565***  -0.116  -0.059  0.599***  -0.009 
  (0.323)  (0.001)  (0.319)  (0.717)  (0.001)  (0.945) 
MB Ratio  -0.129*  0.051  0.013  -0.239***  0.021  -0.001 
  (0.059)  (0.232)  (0.834)  (0.003)  (0.703)  (0.995) 
Constant  1.092  -8.689***  2.513  -0.490  -9.636***  1.354 
  (0.585)  (0.001)  (0.188)  (0.837)  (0.001)  (0.515) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  600  607  588  385  391  412 
R
2  0.292  0.421  0.442  0.306  0.493  0.449 
 
Panel C: Controlling for Campaign Contributions and Political Connections 
  All Firms  Lobbying Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.056*  -0.055*  -0.111**     -0.113**    
  (0.100)  (0.078)  (0.038)    (0.026)    Log(Lobbying Expenses)        -0.199**    -0.183** 
        (0.026)    (0.036) 
Contributions Rank  0.004    -0.014       
  (0.934)    (0.809)        Log(Contributions)        0.011     
        (0.906)      Republican on Board    -0.307      -0.534**  -0.525** 
    (0.101)      (0.013)  (0.015) 
Democrat on Board    0.161      0.157  0.144 
    (0.510)      (0.522)  (0.555) 
MB Ratio  0.023  0.024  0.126*  0.124*  0.131*  0.131* 
  (0.686)  (0.672)  (0.06)  (0.066)  (0.050)  (0.052) 
Log(Assets)  -0.134  -0.116  -0.087  -0.111  -0.063  -0.076 
  (0.227)  (0.261)  (0.545)  (0.446)  (0.640)  (0.580) 
Constant  -0.026  -0.294  -0.218  0.866  -0.672  0.234 
  (0.989)  (0.881)  (0.932)  (0.724)  (0.789)  (0.923) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  617  617  421  421  421  421 
R
2  0.393  0.396  0.457  0.457  0.464  0.463 
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 Panel D: Controlling for Regulated Industries 
  All Firms  Lobbying Sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.056*  -0.053*  -0.117**     -0.110**    
  (0.063)  (0.060)  (0.017)    (0.016)    Log(Lobbying Expenses)        -0.196**    -0.215*** 
        (0.021)    (0.005) 
Regulated Industry  -1.534**    -1.833**  -1.857**     
  (0.049)    (0.043)  (0.042)      HHI    0.448***      0.462***  0.464*** 
    (0.001)      (0.001)  (0.001) 
Log(Assets)  -0.131  -0.036  -0.101  -0.109  0.079  0.099 
  (0.197)  (0.673)  (0.448)  (0.422)  (0.473)  (0.375) 
MB Ratio  0.016  -0.038  0.118*  0.118*  0.064  0.067 
  (0.772)  (0.495)  (0.077)  (0.078)  (0.324)  (0.307) 
Constant  1.479  -0.102  1.815  2.724  -1.969  -1.381 
  (0.488)  (0.944)  (0.505)  (0.299)  (0.277)  (0.424) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
N  617  617  421  421  421  421 
R
2  0.397  0.089  0.463  0.463  0.116  0.121 
 
Panel E: Controlling for State-level Corruption 
 
   All Firms  Lobbying Sample 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Lobbying Rank  -0.061*  -0.059*     
  (0.051)  (0.058)     
Log(Lobbying Expenses)       -0.199**  -0.184** 
       (0.023)  (0.038) 
BGA Index < Median  -0.426**     -0.486**   
  (0.018)     (0.032)   
Corruption Rate > Median    -0.449**    -0.464** 
    (0.011)    (0.033) 
Log(Assets)  -0.097  -0.109  -0.079  -0.097 
  (0.350)  (0.292)  (0.572)  (0.491) 
MB Ratio  0.007  0.008  0.107  0.110 
  (0.907)  (0.892)  (0.136)  (0.120) 
Constant  -0.426  -0.242  0.418  0.628 
  (0.826)  (0.901)  (0.864)  (0.798) 
Industry FE FF49  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N  596  596  402  402 
R
2  0.380  0.381  0.439  0.439 
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